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TRIAL PRACTICE-DEMURRER UPON EVIDENCE AS A DEVICE FOR
TAKING A CASE FROM THE JURY-By far the oldest of the common law
devices for taking a case away from a jury is the demurrer upon eviden~e. A reported instance of its use appears as early as 1456.1
·
To the modern lawyer familiar with demurrers ·to pleadings and
similar motions, the modus operandi of this ancient procedure will not
be altogether strange. It was used by a defendant, after the plaintiff's
evidence was in and he had rested his case, to challenge the sufficiency
of that evidence to warrant a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff.
The defendant tacitly admitted the plaintiff's evidence to be true, but
claimed that even so and construing it as strongly as possible in the
plaintiff's favor, it did not entitle him to a verdict and judgment.2 If
the court, taking the plaintiff's evidence as true and giving to him the
benefit of every inference of fact which a jury might reasonably draw
from such ·evidence, agreed with the defendant that it was insufficient to
maintain the issue, the demurrer would be sustained and a judgment
entered for the defendant.3 On the other hand, if the court determined
1 Prior of Tikeford v. Prior of Caldwell, Y. B., 34 Hen. 6, p. 36, 7. ( 1456), ·translated in THAYER, CASES ON EvIDENCE, 2d ed., 201 (1900).
2 Newis v. Lark and Hunt (Scholastica's Case), 2 Plowden 403, 75' Eng. Rep.
609 (1571).' For the form of a demurrer upon evidence see TIDD, PRACTICAL' FoRMS
160 (1779) . .
8 Carrington v. Caller, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 175 (1829); Burton v. Brashear, 3 A. K.
Marsh. (10 Ky.) 276 (1821); Forbes v. Church, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 159 (1802.).;
Stephens v. White, 2 Wash. (Va.) 203 (1796).
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that the jury could reasonably have returned a verdict against the defendant on the strength of the evidence demurred upon, the demurrer
would be overruled and a judgment entered for the plaintiff,'
A plaintiff could also demur upon the defendant's evidence, if, by
reason of having pleaded an affirmative defense, the burden of pro_of
was on the defendant. 5 The party having the burden of proof could
not, however, demur upon the evidence,° since an adjudication that his
adversary's defensive evidence .was inadequate would not determine
the question whether his own evidence was sufficient in law .to maintain
the issue. And, obviously, he could not demur upon his own evidence
so as to admit the truth thereof.
. A demurrer upon evidence was proper only at the conclusion of the
evidence demurred upon, usually the plaintiff's. If the defendant proceeded, after the plaintiff had rested his case, to introduce his own evidence, he waived any claim based upon the inadequacy of the plaintiff's
evidence and could not later demur thereon. 7
To a modern lawyer, the strangest characteristic of the demurrer
upon evidence is the finality of the judgment that followed upon its
overruling. He is familiar with motions for directed verdicts and, in
some jurisdictions, for involuntary nonsuits. The granting of such motions will usually result in judgment against the plaintiff; but their
denial will not ordinarily be followed by a judgment against the defendant. Usually, the defendant will proceed with his case in precisely
the same manner as if no such motion had been made. If the motion is
made at the conclusion of the plaintiff's proofs, the defendant will proceed with the introduction of his defensive evidence; if made at the
conclusion of the evidence of both parties, the case will be argued and
submitted to the jury.8
•

4

Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, I Dougl. 119, 99 Eng. Rep. So (1779); Dearing, Sink

& Co. v. Smith & Wright, 4 Ala. 432 (1842); McCreary.v. Fike, 2 Black£. (Ind.) 372

(1830); Chewning v. Gatewood, 5 How. (6 Miss.) 552 (1841); Patrick v. Hallett,
1 John. (N.Y.) 241 (1806); Feay v. DeCamp, 15 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 227 (1826) l
Trout v. Virginia & Tennessee R. R. Co., 23 Gratt. 619 (i873); Bank of the United
States v. Smith, 11 Wheat. (24 U.S.) 171 (1826).
5
Standley v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 Ind. 254 (1883).
6
Fritz v. Clark, So Ind. 591 (1881); Middleton v. Commonwealth, 1 Litt. (11
Ky.) 347 (1822); Goodman v. Ford, 1 Cush. (23 Miss.) 592 (1852). Cf. the contra
practice in the Virginias, infra -note 36. The unavailability of a demurrer on evidence
to the party having the burden of proof is probably the source of the rule which prevails in some states that a verdict cannot be directed in favor of such a party. See Sunderland, "Directing a Verdict for the Party having the Burden of Proof," 11 M1cH. L.
REV. 198 (1913).
.
1
Catlin, Peeples & Co. v. Gilders, 3 Ala. 536 (1842); Hart. v. Calloway, 2
Bibb (5 Ky.) 460 (18n). But cross-examination of plaintiff's witnesses did not preclude defendant from demurring on the evidence. Burton v. Brashear, 3 A. K. Marsh.
(10 Ky.) 276 (1821).
8 See Sco-rr, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE 98 (1922).
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• Not so on the old demurrer upon evidence. When- his demurrer
was overruled, the defendant was finished. He could not thereafter introduce any evidence of his own, nor would the case be submitted to the
jury on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence alone. A final judgment
against the defendant was entered immediately upon the overruling of
his demurrer.9
This seemingly harsh doctrine was altogether compatible with and
probably resulted from the procedural policy underlying t~e entire
structure of common law pleading, namely, that every case should be
reduced to a single issue either of law or of fact and then determined
upon the basis of that issue.10 In the pleading stage of a cause, considerable latitude was allowed to the parties in arriving at the particular
issue upon which decision of the case would hinge; but once a proper
issue was reached, its determination was conclusive. For example, a defendant might demur to the plaintiff's declaration and raise an i~sue of
law or he might enter a plea and raise an issue of fact. But he could not,
under the original scheme of common law pleading, do both, either concurrently 11 or successively. If h~ chose to demur on the law and was
overruled, he could not thereafter plead on the facts. When his demurrer was overruled, final judgment was entered against him.12
The demurrer upon evidence oper!lted in precisely the same
fashion. Defendant was not required to demur. Instead, after plaintiff
had rested, he could proceed with the introduction of his own defensive
evidence. But if he chose to demur, the die was irrevocably cast and if
he lost, it was final.
Except for the amount of damages if the demurrer should be overruled, there was nothing further for a jury to do in a case, after issue
was joined on a demurrer upon evidence. The jury originally impanelled to try the case was accordingly discharged.18 But since the
overruling of the demurrer did not determine the quantum of the damages, that issue might be submitted to· the jurors before their discharge
and a conditional verdict taken for use in the event of a judgment for
the plaintiff on the demurrer. Or the matter of damages might be left
to await decision on the demurrer. Then, if judgment was for the
9 ld. 94; Gluck v. Cox, <)O Ala. 331, 8 S. 161 (1889); Garrett v: Reid-Cashion
Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P. 1044, 34 Ariz. 482, 272 P. 918 (1928)3
Golden v. Knowles, 120 Mass. 336 (1876); Hall v. Browder's Administrators, 4
How. (5 Miss.) 224 (1840); Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v.
Templeton, 87 Tex. 42, 26 S. W. 1066 (1894).
·
10 Simpson, '·'A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problem," 53 HARV. L. REv.
169 at 173 (1939).
11 Haiton v. Jeffreys, 10 Mod. 280, 88 Eng. Rep. 728 (1715),
12 GAVIT, CASES AND -MATERIALS ON INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 4 (1936).
18 Hall v. Browder's Administrators, 4 How. (5 Miss.) 224 (1840).
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plaintiff, damages could be assessed by a new jury on a writ of fnquiry.14 This was the preferred and most usual course at common law.15
In the later days of common law pleading, an unsuccessful demurrant to the pleadings was usually permitted to "plead over" and raise
an issue of fact, notwithstanding his defeat on the issue of law raised by
his demurrer.16 But the discharge of the jury upon the joinder of issue
on a demurrer upon evidence precluded any similar relaxation in respect to the finality which attached to the overruling of such a demurrer. And it would have been impracticable not to discharge them.
Under the English nisi prius system of courts, all the proceedings in a
case other than the actual trial to the jury took place before the court at
Westminster.17 This included the decision upon a demurrer upon evidence.18 When issue was joined on such a demurrer, it clearly would
have been impossible to hold the jury together until the record could
be returned to and the demurrer disposed of by the court at Westminster.
A demurrer upon evidence was required to be in writing. 19 Further,
it was required to contain a statement of the evidence demurred upon. 20
This also was probably a consequence of the nisi prius system. As already mentioned, the decision of a demurrer upon evidence was a matter for the court at Westminster. But the judges there, with the possible exception of one of them who might have presided at the nisi prius
hearing, would be total strangers to the evidence which had been presented at such hearing. To acquaint them with it, so that they might
14 Darrose v. Newbott, Cro. Car. 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 726 (1629); Herbert v.
Walters, 1 Ld. Raym. 59, 91 Eng. Rep. 935 (1695); Gluck v. Cox, 90 Ala. 331, 8 S.
161 (1889); McCreary v. Fike, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 374 (1830); Lindley v. Kelley, 42
Ind. 294 (1873). On the hearing on the writ of inquiry, the unsuccessful demurrant
was permitted to put in proofs on the issue of damages. Obaugh v. Finn, 4 Ark. l IO
( 1842). Of course, the court could determine the damages if they were liquidated,
Nuttall's Administrator v. M'Donald, 6 Call. (10 Va.) 53 (1806); Mapel v. John,
42 W. Va. 30, 24 S. E. 608 (1896); or if both parties consented, Strough v. Gear, 48
Ind. 100 (1874).
16 Darrose v. Newbott, Cro. Car. 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 726 (1629). Cf. Young v.
Foster, 7 Port. (Ala.) 420 (1838), where the technique of the conditional verdict is
said to be preferred.
16 SHIPMAN, CoMMON LAw PLEADING, 3d ed., 287 (1923).
17 Scorr & SIMPSON, CASES ON JuDicIAL REMEDIES 9 (1938).
18 3 BLAcKST. CoMM., Cooley's ed., 372 (1884).
19 Hinote v. Simpson & Co., 17 Fla. 444 (1880); Creach v. Taylor, 2 Scamm.
(3 Ill.) 277 (1840); Golden v. Knowles, 120 Mass. 336 (1876); Stiles v. Inman,
55 Miss. 469 (1877).
20 Skinner Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 51 Fla. 324, 41 S. 28 (1906); Lindley
v. Kelley, 42 Ind. 294 (1873); Stiles v. Inman, 55 Miss. 469 (1877). Where the
plaintiff demurred on the defendant's evidence (the latter having the burden of proof),
the evidence of both parties was required to be set out ,in the demurrer. Strough v.
Gear, 48 Ind. 100 (1874).
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judge of its sufficiency, a statement of the evidence was required to be
incorporated into the demurrer itself and thus made a part of the
record.
To complete the issue on a demurrer upon evidence, a joinder by
the plaintiff was necessary,21 just as, at common law, it was necessary
that there be a joinder in a demurrer to pleadings. 22
Prior to 1600, the joinder by the plaintiff in the defendant's demurrer apparently was optional with him. 28 But in that year Baker's
Case, reported by Coke as imposing the duty upon the plaintiff in all
cases to join in the defendant's demurrer,24 put an end to the consensual
nature of the joinder in demurrer,25 except in criminal cases. 26
It has already been mentioned that on a demurrer upon evidence,
the defendant admitted the truth of the plaintiff's evidence and that
the court was bound to construe such evidence as strongly as possible in
the plaintiff's favor. Or, as it was sometimes stated, the defendant admitted to be true all those facts which the evidence reasonably tended to
prove.
Until 1793, this admission was tacit and implied from the fact of
the demurrer, in the same manner that an admission of the truth of the
21 Creach v. Taylor, 2 Scamm. (3 Ill.) 277 (1840); Golden v. Knowles, 120
Mass. 336 (1876); Dozier v. Anstill & Marshall, 8 S. & M. (16 Miss.) 528 (1847).
The lack of a joinder was held not fatal in Gluck v. Cox, 90 Ala. 331, 8 S. 161
(1889), where no objection was taken by the demurrant and both parties proceeded
to argue the demurrer.
22 SHIPMAN, CoMMON LAW PLEADING, 3d ed., 288 (1923).
23 Prior of Tikeford v. Prior of Caldwell, Y.B., 34 Hen. 6, p. 36, 7 (1456),
translated in THAYER, CASES ON EvIDENcE, 2d ed., 201 (1900); Anonymous, I Dyer
2a, 73 Eng. Rep. 5 (1543); The King v. Muschampt, I Dyer 52b, 73 Eng. Rep. u6
(1543); SIR RoBERT HEATH, MAXIMS AND RuLEs OF PLEADING 95-96 (1694);
Newis v. Lark and Hunt (Scholastica's Case), 2 Plowden 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609
(1571); Reniger v. Fogossa, I Plowden I, 75 Eng. Rep. I (1551).
2 "' 5 Co. Rep. 104a ( I 600).
2 G "The plaintiff may not refuse to join in the demurrer, if he is not willing to
waive his evidence." Worsley v. Filisker, z Rolle I l 9, 8 I Eng. Rep. 697 ( I 620).
See also, Alexander v. Fitzpatrick, 4 Port. (Ala.) 405 (1837); Shields v. Arnold, I
Black£. (Ind.) 109 (1820).
26 Baker's Case, 5 Co. Rep. Io~, 77 Eng. Rep. 216, sub. nom. Middleton v.
Baker, Cro. Eliz. 752, 78 Eng. Rep. 983 (1600). For authority for the proposition
that the King's Counsel must consent to a demurrer upon evidence in criminal cases
Coke cited The King v. Muschampt, I Dyer 526, 73 Eng. Rep. II6 (1543). Here
the court held that if the King's Counsel refused to join in the demurrer the case
should be left to the jury. It is unlikely, however, that this holding was based upon
any notion of royal prerogative; rather, it was a simple application to a criminal case
of a doctrine that then applied in all cases.
The arbitrary line thus drawn prevailed. Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 107 (1855);
Holland v. Florida, 39 Fla. 178, 22 S. 814 (1897); State v. Soper, 4 Shep. (16 Me.)
293 (1839); Doss v. Commonwealth, I Gratt. (42 Va.) 557 (1844).
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well pleaded allegation in the pleadings was and still is implied. in a
demurrer to the pleadings.27 But in that year, the case of Gibson 'Q.
Hunter went further and laid down the proposition that in a demurrer
on evidence the demurrant was required, not merely to recite the ,evidence, but to state the facts which the evidence tended to prove and
formally to admit them to be true.28 "It was not competent," said Lord
Chief Justice Eyre, "for the defendants to insist upon the jury being
discharged from giving a verdict, by demurring to the evidence, and
obliging the plaintiff to join in demurrer, without distinctly admitting
upon the record, every fact, and every conclusion, which the evidence
given for the Plaintiff conduced to prove." 29
This was new.80 The earlier cases established no such requiremel).t
for a demurrer on evidence.81 Neither Coke nor Blackstone mention it.
Nor is there anything in the earlier form books to indicate that anything
was required in the demurrer other than a mere statement of the evidence.82
This was too great a burden for the already antiquated demurrer
upon evidence to bear, and no case involving its use appears in the English reports after the decision in Gibson v. Hunter.88 In that case, Lord
Eyre had remarked that he had "very confident expectations that a de.:..
murrer like the present will never hereafter find its way into this
27 GAVIT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND THE JumciAL
PROCESS 4 (1936).
28 Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 187, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793).
29 Id. at 209 •.
30 THAYER, CASES ON EVIDENCE, 2d ed., 217, note (1900).
31 In Newis v. Lark and Hunt (Scholastica's Case), 2 Plowden 403, 75 Eng. Rep.
609 ( 1571), the complete record is prefaced to the report proper. From such record it
~ppears that the demurrant recited the evidence, but he did not state or admit any
-~timate facts which the evidence tended to prove.
.
In Wright v. Pindar, Aleyn 18, 82 Eng. Rep. 892_(1648), sub nom., W~ite
v. Pynder, Style 22, 34, 82 Eng. Rep. 499, 509, much relied on by Lord Eyr~ in
Gibson v. Hunter, there is a statement that a defendant may not be admitted to
his demurrer, unless he will con'fess the matter of fact to be true. It is doubtful that
this was intended to mean that such confession had to be formal and on the record, ~s
Lord Eyre later asserted. Rather, it was probably intended to mean no more than that
a defendant could not demur upon the evidence and at the same time deny the truth
of a fact which the evidence tended to prove, as the defendant in Wright v. Pyndar
had actually attempted to do.
In Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, 1 Dougl. 119, 99 Eng. Rep. So. (1779), decided
upon a demurrer on evidence only fourteen years before Gibson v. Hunter, the
demurrer was in the usual form and did not contain any formal statement or admission
of any of the ultimate facts involYed. Obviously perplexed by the decision in Gipson
v. Hunter, Henry Blackstone appended to his report of the case the record in Cocksedge v. Fanshaw and not very successfully endeavoured to distinguish the two.
32 See, e.g., TmD, PRACTICAL FoRMS 160 (1779).
33 THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EvmENCE 236 (1898).
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·house." Over a century later Lord Blackburn observed that his Lordship's expectations "have been justified by the result.""34
.
In this country, demurrers upon evidence have been little used,
especially in those jurisdictions where the requirements of Gibson v.
Hunter were adopted and adhered to. 85 It was only where the doctrine
Sewell v. Burdick, IO App. Cas. (H.L.) 74 at 99 (1884).
Arizona: Garrett v. Reid-Cashion Land & Cattle Co., 34 Ariz. 245, 270 P.
rn44, on rehearing, 34 Ariz. 482, 272 P. 918 (1928), is the only case involving a
demurrer on evidence. That it was little understood is evidenced by the fact that the
demurrer was in the form of a verbal motion! Florida: Gibson v. Hunter was followed
in Higgs v. Shehee, 4 Fla. 382 (1852). Demurrers were seldom used thereafter, until
1895, when a statute provided that upon the overruling of a demurrer, the defendant
could withdraw it and proceed with his own proofs. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws (1927)
§ 4309. This operated to revive the demurrer for a time [e.g., Myers v. Hodges, 53
Fla. 197, 44 S. 357 ( I 907)], but it does not appear to have been used since Drayton v.
State, 78 Fla. 254, 82 S. 801 (1919). Illinois: Gibson v. Hunter was followed in
Dormady v. State Bank, 2 Scamm. (3 Ill.) 236 (1840); Creach v. Taylor, 2 Scamm.
(3 Ill.) 277 (1840); and Crowe v. People, 92 Ill. 231 (1879). The only later case
is Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Link, 10 Ill. App. 292 (1881), although the
"demurrer is discussed in Rockhill v. Congress Hotel Co., 237 Ill. 98, 86 N. E. 740
(1908), and Marland Refining Co. v. Lewis, 264 Ill. App. 163 (1932). In both these
cases, trial was by the court without a jury! Iowa: Gibson v. Hunter was followed in
Jones v. Ireland, 4 Iowa 62 (1856); Hardin v. Snyder, 15 Iowa 460 (1863); and
Coates v. Galena & Chicago Union R. R. Co., 18 Iowa 277 (1865). The demurrer
·not heard of thereafter. Kentucky: Gibson v. Hunter was followed in 'White v.
Fox, l Bibb 369 (1809). The demurrer was occasionally used thereafter, e.g.,
Chapize v. Bane, r Bibb (4 Ky.) 612 (1809); Burton v. Brashear, 3 A. K. Marsh
(IO Ky.) 276 (1821), but not since Ditto & Lansdale v. Ditto's Administrators,
4 Dana (34 Ky.) 502 (1836). Louisiana: No case involving a demurrer on evidence
appears after Skilliman v. Jones, 3 Mart. (N. S.) 686 (1825), where Gibson v.
Hunter was followed. Maine: In State v. Stoyell, 54 Me. 24 (1866), the demurrer
is referred to as "obsolete." No later cases appear. Maryland: Gibson v. Hunter was
adopted in Forbe's v. Perrie's Administrator, 1 Harr. & J. (5 Md.) 109 (1801).
No later ·cases appear. Massachusetts: Copeland v. New England Ins. Co., 22 Pick.
(39 Mass.) 135 (1839), followed the rule of Gibson v. Hunter, after which the
demurrer was little used. Golden v. Knowles, 120 Mass. 336 (1876), appears to be
the last case. Mississippi: Waul v. Kirkman, 5 Cush. (27 Miss.) 823 (1854), and
·Western Assurance Co. v. Mayer, 64 Miss. 795, 2 S. 173 (1887), are in accord with
Gibson v. Hunter. Holmes v. Preston, 70 Miss. 152, 12 S. 292 (1892), is the last
ca~e. New Mexico: Pino v. Hatch, 1 N. M. 125 (1855), which followed Gibson v.
Hunter, is the only case involving a _true demurrer on evidence. New York: The
demurrer on evidence is said to be no longer available, in Colegrove v. N. Y. & N. H.
R.R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492 (1859). North, Carolina: Gibson v. Hunter was followed in
Nelson v. Whitfield, 82 N. C. 46 (1880). There are no cases involving true common
law demurrers after Bond v. Wool, 107 N. C. 139, 12 S. E. 281 (1890). Of?io:
Demurrers on evidence have not been used since Chappelear v. Martin, 45 Ohio St.
126, 12 N. E. 448 (1887). Pennsylvania: Gibson v. Hunter was followed in Ross
& Vaughan's Lessee v. Eason, 4 Yeates 54 (1796). Later cases permitted the facts
to ·be stipulated on the record, rather than stated and admitted in the demurrer itself,
Duerhagen v. United States Ins. Co., 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 185 (1816), but even this
84

35

is
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of that case was repudiated or ignored that they were resorted to with.
any degree of frequency. 86 In some states, they apparently have ·nevei:
does not always seem to have been required. E.g., in Feay v. DeCamp,' 15 Serg. &"R:
(Pa.) 22 7 ( 1826), the requisite admissions appear to have been tacit and implied from
the fact of the demurrer. No civil case involving a demurrer upon evidence appears
after McKowen v. McDonald, 43 Pa. St. 441 (1862). Tennessee: Gibson v. Hunter
was followed in Bedford v. Ingram, 5 Hayw. (3 Tenn.) 155 (1818). The demurrer
is not heard of again until Hopkins v. Railroad, 12 Pick. (96 Tenn.) 409, 34 S.. W.
1029 ( I 896), where it appears to be sufficient to append to the demurrer a me:Fe
general admission that the evidence stated and all proper inferences therefrom are'
true. There are a few later cases, but none since Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. L:
R. R. Co. v. Sansom, 5 Cates (113 Tenn.)' 683, 84 S. W. 615 (1905). · Te.wrf:
Booth v. Cotton, 13 Tex. 359 (1855), followed Gibson v. Hunter, but some later
cases seem to have ignored the requirement of a formal admission. See, e.g., Hughes v:
Christy, 26 Tex. 231 (1862), and International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 17 Tex.
Civ. App. 340, 43 S.W. 540 (1897). No cases involving demurrers appear after
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Cleaver, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 294, 106 S.W. '72·1
(1908). Vermont: In Bass v. Rublee, 76 Vt. 395, 57 A. 965 (1904), there- is. ah
elaborate dictum in accord with Gibson v. Hunter. · There seem -to be no other case!!.
United States: Gibson v. Hunter was followed in F-0wle v. Common Council• -of
Alexandria, I I Wheat. (24 U.S.) 320 (1826). There -are only a few cases thereafter.
See Slocum v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S. Ct. 523 (1913).
36
In Alabama, the necessity for compliance with the rule of Gibson v. Hunter
was questioned in Young v. Foster, 7 Port. 420 (1838), and subsequently ignored.
See, e.g., Dearing, Sink & Co. v. Smith & Wright, 4 Al;i. 432 (1842); Holman v.
Whiting, 19 Ala. 703 ( I 8 5 I). As a consequence, there are numerous cases involving
its use. Two recent ones are McCarty v. Williams, 212 Ala. 232, 102 S. 133 (1924),
and Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Berrie, 31 Ala. App. 178, 13 S. (2d) 696
(1943), in the latter of which the procedure is referred to as "novel."
In Indiana, the doctrine of Gibson v. Hunter was rejected. See Indianapolis &
Vincennes R. R. Co. v. McLin, 82 Ind. 435 (1882). And demurrers were much
used for a time. See Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Foster, 104 Ind. 293, 4 N.E._ 20
(1885); Milburn v. Phillips, 136 Ind. 680, 34 N.E. 983, 36 N.E. 360 (1893); and
cases cited. But no case involving, their use appears after Plaskett v. Benton-Warren
Agricultural Society, 45 Ind. App. 358, 89 N.E. 968 (1909).
In the Virginias, the demurrer on evidence was much used, even into modern
times, due to the inability of the courts either to nonsuit a plaintiff against his consent
fThweat & Hinton v. Finch, I Wash. (Va.) 217 (1793) ], or to direct a verdict
(Keel & Roberts v. Herbert, 1 Wash. (Va.) 203 (1793) ]. But the common law pattern
was considerably altered. Gibson v. Hunter was repudiated (Whittington v. Christian, 2 Rand. (23 Va.) 353 (1824)]; the demurrer could be interposed at the close
of all the evidence, not merely at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence (Hoyle v.
Young, 1 Wash. (Va.) 150 (1793); Adkins v. Fry, 38 W. Va. 549, 18 S.E. 737
(1893)]; and it was available to either party regardless of the burden of proof
fBonos v. Ferries Co., II3 Va. 495, 75 S.E. 126 (1912); Conner v. Jarrett, 120 W.
Va. 633,200 S.E. 39 (1938)]. It is unlikely, however, that even this modified demurrer will continue long to be much used, in view of the present power of the court in
West Virginia to direct a verdict (White v. Hoster Brewing Co., 51 W. Va. 259, 41
S.E. 180 (1902); Soward v. American Car & Foundry Co., 66 W. Va. 266, 66 S.E.
3 29 ( I 909)], and the recent development in Virginia of a motion to strike out or
exclude the i:vidence [Green v. Smith, 153 Va. 675, 151 S.E. 282 (1930)].
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been used at all, 37 although the name "demurrer on evidence" is occasionally employed to describe what really is no more than a motion for
a directed verdict.38
Charles H. King*
87 California, Colorado, Con~ecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho [ see Dunlap v.
Savage, 54 Idaho 87, 29 P. (2d) 493, (x934) ], Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri [see Diamond Rubber Co. v. Wernicke, 166 Mo. App. 128, 148 S.W. 160
(1912); Proctor v. Garman, 203 Mo. App. 106, 218 S.W. 910 (1920) ], Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New .Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. In Arkansas, it was said in Grooms v. Neff Harness Co., 79 Ark. 401, 96
S. W. 135 (1906), that demurrers on evidenc~ were unknown. But see Obaugh v.
Finn, 4 Ark.. II0 (1842.).
• 38 State v. Jackson, 283 Mo. 18, 222 S.W. 746 (1920); Dunn v. Bozarth, 59
Neb. 244, 80 N.W~ 8II (1899); Merchants Bank v. Dunn, 41 N.M. 432, 70 P.
(2d) 760 (1937); State v. Burton, 138 N.C. 575, 50 S.E. 214 (1905); Kansas
City S. Ry. Co. '!"· Tucker, 108 Okla. 259, 236 P. 35 (1925); Brown v. Lewis, 50
Ore. 358, 92 P. 1058 (1907). See also, Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) § 602909; Mich. Stat. Ann. (1938) §§ 27.1036, 27.1037.
Acting Dean, Detroit College of Law.
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